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 Book Reviews
 cepts of religion and metaphysics had relied upon a syndrome of validity that
 dissolved with the emergence of expert cultures in science, morality, and law on
 the one hand, and with the autonomization of art on the other" (p. 17).
 Habermas rightly recognizes, I think, that the cognitive content of religion is
 tied to metaphysics. For if religion claims, as David Tracy says, "to speak validly
 of the 'whole' of reality" ("Theology, Critical Social Theory, and the Public
 Realm," in Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology, ed. Don S. Browning and
 Francis Schiissler Fiorenza [New York, 1992], p. 36), then religion necessarily
 raises or attempts to raise a fourth validity claim, which is metaphysical. Because
 Habermas denies the possibility of metaphysics, he discards the cognitive content
 of religion altogether while retaining merely its consoling power in the face of
 life's existential crises. As he puts it, "Religion, which has largely been deprived
 of its worldview functions, is still indispensable in ordinary life for normalizing
 intercourse with the extraordinary.... Philosophy, even in its postmetaphysical
 form, will be able neither to replace nor to repress religion as long as religious
 language is the bearer of a semantic content that is inspiring and even indispens-
 able" (p. 51).
 My primary criticism of Habermas is that he does not really offer an argument
 against metaphysics but, rather, seems simply to accept the modern eclipse of
 metaphysics as sufficient proof or justification of its impossibility. To employ his
 own terms, he appears to accept the "currency" of postmetaphysical thinking as
 sufficient justification of its "validity."
 In conclusion, this book is important for scholars of religion not only because
 it sheds further light on the views of one of today's most significant thinkers but,
 even more importantly, because it properly focuses the conversation between reli-
 gion and philosophy on the question of metaphysics. For if Habermas is correct
 in denying the possibility of metaphysics, then religious claims cannot, I judge,
 be true or valid in any meaningful sense but, at most, may function as a useful or
 inspiring "illusion." It is on this crucial point that theologians and philosophers
 of religion must be prepared to engage in the debate.
 WILLIAM J. MEYER, Indiana University.
 MILLER, RICHARD B. Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism, and the Just War Tradi-
 tion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 294 pp. $48.00 (cloth);
 $17.00 (paper).
 Richard Miller opts for the "low road of ethical inquiry" (p. 6), engaging diverse
 voices in their practical wrestling with conflict and violence, hoping thereby to
 isolate those areas where pacifist and just war traditions converge. This road leads
 through fascinating country, from John Bennett, Roland Bainton, and the broth-
 ers Niebuhr to Pius XII, Dorothy Day, and Martin Luther King. His superb ac-
 count of William O'Brien and "American Exceptionalism," the recurrent notion
 that our place in history exempts us from ordinary moral constraints, forcefully
 displays how contemporary rhetoric about democracy, leadership, and a new
 world order is the legacy of puritanism, colonialism, and nineteenth-century im-
 perialism.
 Miller's hope throughout is to demonstrate how the fundamental duty of"non-
 maleficence as nonpreferential compassion and respect for others" (p. 241),
 works with phronesis to overcome the limits of competing positions. It is not clear,
 however, that the principals in the debate between pacifism and the just war tradi-
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 tion would be able to recognize themselves in Miller's reconstruction. "Nonma-
 leficence" is not the issue, for example, between John Yoder and Stanley Hauer-
 was, on the one hand, and Paul Ramsey, on the other. Theirs is a concrete
 theological dispute about the meaning of agape and the challenge it poses to this-
 worldly justice. Miller's quest for "a nonconfessional idiom to resist the ideology
 of memory" (p. 234) may appear moderate and unexceptionable on the surface,
 but it registers a judgment against those like Yoder, Hauerwas, and Ramsey who,
 in their different ways, think theology and religious belief not only can, but must,
 be decisive in understanding the meaning of political force and armed conflict.
 Nor would Thomists like Francisco de Vitoria, or their secular Aristotelian
 counterparts, be eager to see themselves represented in Miller's terms. For that
 tradition it is justice, ultimately, that makes duties intelligible and explains why
 failing to perform results in injustice. It is a fact of our political experience that
 individuals and communities differ over the substance of justice, but this is part
 of being human, situated in history and struggling to secure individual flour-
 ishing and the common good. For the Aristotelian, secular or religious, the lan-
 guage of duties divorced from justice masks the key issues of intention, malice,
 and what each is due in virtue of his or her membership and role in the life of
 the community. This, at least, would be Saint Thomas's response to Miller's dis-
 cussion of "the trade-off between the moral values of justice and order" (p. 58).
 Order in the abstract is not a moral value. It is necessary for the social commerce
 that secures our common good but is ultimately incommensurate with our unwa-
 vering commitment to justice as a fundamental constituent of the common good.
 For this tradition, phronesis, practical reasoning about what is and what ought to
 be done, cannot get started without a substantive understanding of justice, and
 the absence of such vitiates Miller's account in chapter 9. To put it another way,
 the phronimos, the person of practical wisdom, rejects "exceptionalism" and "polit-
 ical realism" not as ideologies but because they are forms of injustice. To lose sight
 of this is to disengage from what matters most to those committed to virtue and
 community, just as losing sight of the example of Jesus is a failure of faithfulness
 for Christians committed to God's active presence in history. Just war thinkers
 and pacifists of these sorts will likely resist Miller's efforts at convergence.
 Scorr DAVIS, Princeton University.
 BLOCH, MAURICE. Prey into Hunter: The Politics of Religious Experience. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 1992. xiii+ 117 pp. $39.50 (cloth); $12.95 (paper).
 This most recent volume of Lewis Henry Morgan lectures presents a provocative,
 challenging, yet highly speculative theory of ritual. In it, Maurice Bloch elicits
 and explains what he considers an "irreducible structure ... common to many
 ritual and other religious phenomena" (p. 3). This structure Bloch titles "re-
 bounding violence," for it involves two phases each punctuated by moments of
 symbolic or actual violence. The first phase is an expulsion of some "native vital
 element" (e.g., animality or domesticity) and an effective, though temporary,
 transportation of ritual participants from a worldly existence of process and
 change to a permanent transcendental realm. The second phase is a return to
 the mundane without abandoning the transcendental, an aggressive return in
 which some external vitality replaces (via conquest or consumption, for example)
 the original native vitality. Political consequences issue from the requirement that
 this renewed vitality comes from the outside, from some "other" or external
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